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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 44506
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) BONNEVILLE COUNTY NO. CR 2016-1265
v. )
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Sean Paul Dulac appeals from his judgment of conviction for sexual battery of a minor
child  sixteen  to  seventeen  years  of  age  but  not  defined  as  lewd.   The  district  court  imposed  a
unified sentence of twenty years, with four years fixed.  Mr. Dulac subsequently filed an Idaho
Criminal  Rule  (hereinafter, Rule) 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which was denied.1
Mr. Dulac appeals, and he asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence.
1 Because Mr. Dulac did not provide new information in support of his Rule 35 motion,
Mr. Dulac does not challenge the denial of the motion on appeal.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On January 29, 2016, an officer with the Idaho Falls Police Department received a report
from a female that her stepfather, Mr. Dulac had molested her from the age of fourteen until just
before she turned eighteen.  (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.4.)
Mr. Dulac was subsequently interviewed and acknowledged having oral sex and manual-genital
contact with the victim, and stated that the molestation began at the age of sixteen, not fourteen.
(PSI, p.4.)
Mr. Dulac was charged with one count of lewd conduct with a child under sixteen and
one  count  of  sexual  battery  committed  by  lewd  or  lascivious  acts  on  a  minor  child  sixteen  to
seventeen years of age.  (R., p.46.)  He pleaded guilty to one charge of sexual battery of a minor
child  sixteen  to  seventeen  years  of  age  but  not  defined  as  lewd.   (R.,  pp.56,  66.)   The  district
court imposed a unified sentence of twenty years, with four years fixed.  (R., p.80.)  Mr. Dulac
appealed.  (R., p.104.)  He asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence.
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of twenty years,
with four years fixed, upon Mr. Dulac following his plea of guilty to sexual battery on a minor
child sixteen to seventeen years of age?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Twenty
Years, With Four Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Dulac Following His Plea Of Guilty To Sexual Battery
Of A Minor Child Sixteen To Seventeen Years Of Age
Mr. Dulac asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of twenty years,
with four years fixed, is excessive.  Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
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imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)).  Mr. Dulac does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Dulac must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing
State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown,
121 Idaho 385 (1992)).  The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:  (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility
of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe,
99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138
(2001)).
At the sentencing hearing, counsel for Mr. Dulac requested that the court imposed a
sentence of “around 3 years fixed, about 5 or 7 years indeterminate,” and that the court retain
jurisdiction  to  “allow  Mr.  Dulac  to  have  an  opportunity  to  begin  counseling  and  treatment.”
(Tr., p.28, Ls.4-13.)  Counsel noted that Mr. Dulac had no “prior record to speak of, and so this
is really the first time he’s … been before the Court or gone through the criminal justice system.”
(Tr., p.28, Ls.14-17.)  In fact, Mr. Dulac has no prior criminal record of any kind.  (PSI, pp.4-5.)
Further, Mr. Dulac had accepted responsibility for his conduct.  He admitted his conduct
to law enforcement.  (Tr., p.29, Ls.1-3.)  The psychosexual evaluator noted that Mr. Dulac was
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“open and disclosing during this evaluation” and “feels guilty about his behavior, is ashamed of
what he did, and is sorry for the victim.”  (PSI, p.23.)  While the evaluator noted that Mr. Dulac
had  rationalized  his  behavior  to  some  extent,  Mr.  Dulac  clearly  admitted  to  committing  a  sex
offense, and the evaluator determined that Mr. Dulac’s risk level to reoffend fell within the low
risk range.  (PSI, p.23.)  “There was no firm data determined during the court of this evaluation
to indicate that Mr. Dulac evidenced clear deviant preference for young females or children.”
(PSI, p.23.)
Counsel emphasized that Mr. Dulac wanted to engage in treatment and counseling.
(Tr. p.29, Ls.22-25.)  Counsel believed that Mr. Dulac would be a good candidate to get right
into the sex offender-specific treatment that could be offered during a rider.  (Tr., p.31, Ls.2-13.)
Further, the victim’s mother provided a victim impact statement at the sentencing
hearing, and she stated,
the Sean I have seen over the past few months is a person who has – I feel has
deep regret for his actions and is hellbent on improving himself for himself and
for  everyone  he  hurt.   I  think  it  took  this  shameful  process  for  him  to  want  to
change and atone for the things he did.
All I’d ask is for a chance to work on healing our family, hopefully sooner than
later.   As  a  parent,  I  want  him to  pay  for  his  actions.   But  I  also  believe  in  my
vows as a wife, [and] I simply cannot through my husband away, when I believe
in my heart that healing and forgiveness is possible.
(Tr., p.27, Ls.7-18.)
Finally, Mr. Dulac addressed the district court.  He stated,
Your Honor, what I’ve said all along, I apologize for the whole situation.  I know
what I did was wrong.  It’s been an eye-opening experience.  And I just want the
ability  to  address  the  situation,  to  be  able  to  show  my  family  that  I  love  them.
And I want to be able to prove myself to not only my loved ones and my family,
but to society in general, that it’s something that I can make sure never happens
again.
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(Tr., p.37, L.22 – p.38, L.4.)  Considering that Mr. Dulac has no other criminal history,
acknowledged that what he did was wrong, accepted responsibility, expressed a desire for
treatment, and had the support of his wife, Mr. Dulac submits that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing a sentence of twenty years, with four years fixed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Dulac respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 15th day of May, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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